John Richardson declared, “To ensure clarity in our thinking and precision… We’ll no longer use the term A2/AD as a stand-alone acronym that can mean all things to all people or anything to anyone – we have to be better than that.” To resolve this, we must increase the granularity of “A2/AD” to evoke operationally-grounded thought, to serve as the bedrock from which representative strategy can be built. This conflation came to a head in October 2016, when Chief of Naval Operations Adm.
Hypothetically, suppose the Joint Force was instantly transformed to counter all of the threats today, would the term “A2/AD” cease? Unlikely instead the term would simply seek new systems to define its existence. Though the SA-2 is widely proliferated and still in service around the world today, it could not be further from modern A2/AD. It famously shot down Gary Power’s U-2 over Russia in 1960 and was attributed to 190 aircraft losses in the Vietnam War. One could argue that the Russian SA-2 surface-to-air missile system provided an A2/AD capability throughout the 1960s. Counter-A2/AD dialogue still largely remains in the conceptual domain, from the Joint Operational Access Concept to the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons ( JAM-GC, formerly Air-Sea Battle).Įven worse, over time “A2/AD” has become synonymous with modernization dialogue and therefore a relative term. Despite A2/AD having lived in the defense lexicon for 13 years, it is still largely absent from the doctrinal publications of all the armed services. That soon became truncated and proliferated, and the term is now ubiquitously used in defense industry to describe an opposition’s doctrine, strategy, operations, and even an individual weapon’s capabilities. Though the principle of A2/AD has been around for centuries, the phrase actually dates back to 2003 when the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment report stated, “anti-access (A2) strategies aim to prevent US forces entry into a theater of operations, then area-denial (AD) operations aim to prevent their freedom of action in the narrow confines of the area under an enemy’s direct control.” Founded in concepts and strategy, conflict in an A2/AD environment has yet to bridge the gap to manifest itself in operational art, preventing the Joint Force from converting the idea into tactical tasks and stifling operational agility and coherence in future conflict. The predominant phrase used to describe this growing threat environment-anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)-is indiscriminate and problematic. Nations with growing military power have adapted accordingly, leveraging technology to grow increasingly capable threats to counter US force projection. In 1991, Operation Desert Storm showcased the modern US military for all to see-and the world was watching.
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, China PLA, Unrestricted Warfare, 1999
If they want to guarantee their position in the field of military reforms that has already begun and will be completed right away, then the first thing that must be resolved is to eliminate the lag that exists between US military thinking and military technology.